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Abstract
Initial ICO coin offerings have emerged as a new
business financing mechanism. ICOs have raised more
than $ 31.14 billion by 2019, sparking interest in finance
studies. Despite ongoing scientific research on the
topic, academic knowledge remains limited and
fragmented. This study aims to conduct a systematic
review of the literature with 30 contributions from
journals published until January 2020. Based on an indepth analysis of the publications identified, we
describe the landscape of the field of ICOs focusing on
two aspects. First, we conducted an analysis of the
empirical articles that addressed the success
determinants of ICOs. Second, we categorize relevant
contributions in five different perspectives: human and
social
capital,
technological
characteristics,
governance and legal aspects and financial details of
the campaign. Thematic analysis was carried out to
address dominant themes and subthemes in each
perspective.

1. Introduction
Technology startups are currently attracting the
interest of many investors and are already raising large
sums of money, which arouses the interest of studies for
corporate finance [22], [38], [39]. New ventures need
resources to be successful. One of the most critical
resources is having access to finance [8], [40], [41].
Agency problems, information asymmetries, the lack of
cash flows and guarantees make it difficult for
entrepreneurial companies to raise funds [36, p. 18].
There are many barriers encountered in traditional
investment mechanisms, which increase costs for
entrepreneurs and also increase the risk for financial
credit institutions [42], [43]. In this scenario of credit
scarcity, token offerings, or ICOs, have emerged as an
alternative business financing mechanism.
According to PwC's 6th ICO / STO Report, initial
token offerings have already raised by the year 2019
more than 31.14 billion (m.m.) dollars of this total, 4.12
m.m. of dollars were collected in 2019. In 2018, there
was a great peak of fundraising in this modality,
reaching the value of 19.67 m.m. of dollars. In 2017, 7
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m.m. of dollars. The average campaign time also went
from 29 days in 2017 to 81 days in 2019, according to
the report.
According to the ICOBench website, 5,470
campaigns were completed by November 2019, of
which 1,785 were successful and 3,685 failed. Among
the sectors that raised the most funds through the sale of
tokens, the following stand out (in billions of dollars):
Cryptocurrency ($ 14.8), Platform ($ 12.6), Business
services ($ 4.3), Infrastructure ($ 3.7), Banking ($
3.7),among others .The USA, Singapore and Hong
Kong are among the main countries in terms of number
of campaigns throughout 2018 and 2019, which
indicates a strong positioning of these countries in the
offer of tokens. In Europe, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom lead in number of offers completed in the
period, followed by Estonia and Lithuania.
In this context, this theme is emerging as a
promising area of research within the broader sphere of
entrepreneurship research [36] - [55] - [57]. Since the
first publications in 2017, the number of studies on
ICO’s has increased by approximately 700% from 2017
to 2019. In 2017, 280 articles on the topic were
published on Google Scholar. In the 2017-2018 interval,
848 articles were published on the topic. From 2017 to
the end of 2019 there were already more than 2000
publications. In addition, the integration of theories and
concepts from areas such as law for example Kaal [102],
as well as in the area of computing and engineering [21].
exhibit its inherent interdisciplinary nature as a field of
research
Researchers, professionals and policy makers
highlight the importance of this new mechanism for
financing new ventures [1] - [7] - [11]. The ongoing
scientific discussion of ICOS in various academic
entrepreneurship journals (for example, Small Business
Economics; Journal of Business Venturing; Venture
Capital) contributes to the continued legitimation of
ICO’s as a research sub-field in business finance.
The constant growth and multidisciplinary nature of
the field studied makes it difficult to systematize the
ICO literature, and a holistic overview of the field is
necessary. This study continues as follows: in the next
section, we explain the definition of the term ICO. Next,
we describe the method applied and also illustrate the
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research and literature review strategy. Then, we present
how to measure success in this modality and present the
conclusions of systematic literature review. We
included a descriptive analysis of the scientific
development of funding research in the ICO modality,
the synthesized results of the thematic analysis and
signaled the possible paths for future research. We
conclude by summarizing our main conclusions.
Technology startups are currently attracting the interest
of many investors and are already raising large sums of
money, which arouses the interest of studies for
corporate finance [22], [38], [39]. New ventures need
resources to be successful. One of the most critical
resources is having access to finance [8], [40], [41].
Agency problems, information asymmetries, the lack of
cash flows and guarantees make it difficult for
entrepreneurial companies to raise funds [36, p. 18].
There are many barriers encountered in traditional
investment mechanisms, which increase costs for
entrepreneurs and also increase the risk for financial
credit institutions [42], [43]. In this scenario of credit
scarcity, token offerings, or ICOs, have emerged as an
alternative business financing mechanism.
This study continues as follows: in the next section,
we explain the definition of the term ICO. Next, we
describe the method applied and also illustrate the
research and literature review strategy. Then, we present
how to measure success in this modality and present the
conclusions of systematic literature review. We
included a descriptive analysis of the scientific
development of funding research in the ICO modality,
the synthesized results of the thematic analysis and
signaled the possible paths for future research. We
conclude by summarizing our main conclusions.

2. Definition of initial coin offerings (ICOs)
There are many definitions for an initial coin
offering (ICO) in the field of business finance. This
financing modality, although still a recent phenomenon
[1] - [3] has become an increasingly popular way to
increase capital for blockchain technology startups [2],
[4], [5].
ICOs are also known as token sales [6], as in this
modality new ventures increase capital by selling tokens
to a multitude of investors [7]. This fundraising
mechanism is similar to that of crowdfunding
campaigns in terms of the use of digital platforms and
the absence of standard financial intermediaries [8].
However, what really differentiates ICOs from other
alternative financing mechanisms is the issuance of
cryptographic tokens. Thus, tokens, after being issued,
are sold to investors as a way of financing projects [6],
[7], [9] - [11].

According to Fisch [7], a token corresponds to a
unit of value issued by an enterprise and covers a wide
range of applications. These tokens can serve several
purposes.
Fisch [7], points out that the classifications of token
types, from a theoretical point of view, are not yet
unanimous and binding. Some authors, for example, say
that tokens can be classified into two groups:
cryptocurrency and cryptoassets [12] - [15]. Because
they believe that it is more than common among
regulators and professionals, Giudici and Adhami [16]
adopt the following classification: (1) cryptocurrency or
digital currency, which can be subclassified into
payment token or stablecoin (if the token can be used as
crypto currency) and cryptoassets that are classified as:
(2) security token (allows the investor to enjoy profit
rights in some cases the right to vote or even to
contribute to the project), (3) utility token (allows access
to services or exclusive products of the platform. It is
possible for the same startup to be able to issue more
than one type of token for each project. The choice of
the ideal token for each project is related to financing
needs, agency problems, as well as platform
characteristics [17 ]. Crypto currencies are issued,
distributed and controlled by their issuers. However, for
traditional money, these functions are performed by a
central bank [22], [23]. Instead of a central authority or
government, the ICOs that issue the digital currencies
are the ones who determine the price of the coins on the
network [1 ], [24] - [26]. Some authors claim that ICOs
democratize access to finance, reduce transaction costs
and offer a decentralized alternative to traditional
systems for storing securities [23] - [25], [27], [28].
Many enterprises create their own cryptocurrency
by issuing tokens, which are intended to function as an
exclusive currency within the enterprise's own
ecosystem, they are the utility tokens [7].
ICO is still a very recent phenomenon, despite
having its initial launch in 2013, it was highlighted and
became popular only in 2017 as an alternative financing
mechanism [37].

3. Methodology
The ongoing scientific discussion of ICOs in
various academic journals on business finance and
entrepreneurship, as well as in some on information
systems and law, contributes to legitimize the topic in
the field of business finance research. In addition, the
integration of theories and concepts from areas such as
law and information systems indicates the growing
importance of ICOs for actions outside the restricted
context of research on entrepreneurship and finance.
The aim of this study is to systematically review,
categorize and synthesize the existing body of
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knowledge from empirical research to compile a distinct
landscape of scientific development.
The literature review process in this article follows
common and established guidelines [44], [45]. The IS
literature on the subject, which determines the success
of ICOs, was considered.
The review process includes several steps based on
the three stages (planning and selection, extraction and
execution), as demonstrated by Okoli [44] As a first
step, we conducted an in-depth literature search on four
data sites, including EBSCO, Elsevier, Google Scholar
and Web of Science.
Considering the interdisciplinary nature of the
subject, we also use Google Scholar in the research,
using Publish or Perish software, version 4. As a
multidisciplinary database, Google Scholar is not
limited to the journals listed in the ISI (International
Scientific Index), it includes publications in English and
provides greater coverage of unpublished contributions,
such as working papers and conference proceedings.
The review is based on databases covering the most
important IS journals and conferences. In this first stage,
a literature review was carried out to obtain a general
understanding of its current state of development of the
theme. Based on the combinations of the search terms
“initial coin offering”, we perform a title, summary and
keyword search.
The research was carried out in January 2020, with
a time horizon from 1945 to January 2020 and was
limited to contributions published in English.
At this stage of execution, thematic analysis results
will be categorized into groups. To navigate the
complexity, the relevant contributions can be divided
into different categories: human and social capital,
technological characteristics, governance and legal
aspects and financial details of the campaign. Within
each of the categories, several sub-sectors emerged.
This categorization structure is theoretically supported
by studies by Ahlers et al. [46] and Lukkarinen et. Al.
[47] applied in crowdfunding studies. For each
perspective, we present the synthesis of each theme and
the possible opportunities for advancing research on the
theme.

4. Definitions of Success for an ICO.

4.1. Signaling Theory for ICOs
The ICO market still presents many risks, including
low investor protection, a limited set of information
available and virtually no supervision by public

authorities. Unlike established businesses, ICO projects
are characterized by strong information asymmetry and
opacity [1]. This market is far from being transparent in
information. This is due to false declarations, lack of
specific technological knowledge and proven fraud,
which results in severe information asymmetries [7],
[37], [48]. In many studies on ICOs, they use signaling
theory [49] to explain the determinants of success for
ICOs [7]. According to this theory, the importance of
good signage is to reduce risks for investors. ICOs are
considered to be high-risk investments with a high
potential for fraud. Although these digital assets may
present a new and efficient means of carrying out
financial transactions, they also increase the risk of
fraud and manipulation, because the markets for these
assets are less regulated than traditional capital markets
[50]. Thus, it is very important to reduce information
asymmetries, signaling the quality of the project, the
technological and team capacities, in order to obtain
successful financing. The corporate finance literature
states that potential investors prefer to invest in high
quality ventures, because they are more likely to
succeed [7], [46]. In addition, these ventures, in general,
are in early stages, so it is important to signal the quality
of the project and can increase the chances of success,
as investors are averse to high risks [7]. Often, these
ventures in early stages , do not have a proven track
record of a developed product.

4.2. Measure Success
Several ways were used to measure success in the
context of corporate finance. Among them, the amount
of financing raised was used, a measure commonly used
in crowdfunding corporate finance studies [8], [46].
ICOs, as an alternative financing modality, exhibit
similarities with the classic crowdfunding markets.
Therefore, there are similarities in the determinants of
financing success in relation to the characteristics of
human capital, quality of the business model, project
design and social media activity for project
dissemination [51]. Also studies related to ICOs show
that the amount raised in the campaign can be used as a
proxy for success [6], [7], [9], [37], [52].
ICOs can also specify a minimum limit (soft-cap)
and a maximum limit (hard-cap) of fundraising as a way
to achieve success [1], [28], [53]. After the end of the
campaign period, if the minimum limit specified for
financing is reached, the tokens will be issued and
allocated to buyers. In return, buyers send fiat currencies
or cryptocurrencies to issuers. However, if the ventures
do not reach the soft-cap during the campaign, the funds
will be returned to potential buyers.
Amsden and Schweizer [37] state that the measure
of punctual success is given by the total value raised or

Page 4179

if the “target quantity” is reached. However, they argue
that long-term success is ICO's strongest measure of
success. It happens when the token is issued and later
listed on an exchange platform (secondary token
market) and if it is actively traded (it has liquidity).
Based on theories related to IPOs, underpricing is
used in some studies as a proxy for success in other
types of financing. Underpricing occurs as a result of the
large information asymmetry between the ICO issuer
and the investor. In this case, the token is measured at a
price less than the fair value, which means that the price
at which a company issues an asset is below the market
value [54]. However, the price of tokens issued in the
ICO phase, adjusts to a market price during the listing
phase in the secondary market. The underpricing
strategy is used to attract more investors in the primary
campaign phase. Some studies use underpricing to
assess the success of an ICO [1], [11], [54]. Felix et.al
[54] affirm that the results show an average level of
underpricing of ICOs of 123% in the USA. Success by
the speed of fundraising, which is measured by the total
number of days in an ICO campaign[55].

5.Thematic analysis
5.1. Persons
5.1.1. Team. Team. Previous research shows the
importance of a project team as an indicator of the
quality of a project and a relevant factor in attracting
investors [37], [43], [46], [56]. However, given the
peculiarities of ICOs, compared to more traditional
financing modalities, the risk of identity fraud is greater.
The impact of the team in a given project may be more
pronounced in ICOs than in more traditional settings [7].
The quality of the management team is a first-rate
indicator for the success of ICO projects [11], [27].
Several studies have examined the association between
the success of the ICO and information released about
(1) the team in general; (2) team members' reputation
and experience; and (3) team size.
5.1.2.Managerial experience. The previous managerial
experience of the proponents is a valuable asset for
employees [16]. Koch & Siering [62] claim that creating
more projects leads to a learning effect; which means
that the founder gains skills on how to better present the
project and how to succeed in the financing process and
this experience has an effect on the financing decisions
of potential investors. Thus, a founder who is dedicated
to conducting projects for a considerable time is seen as
more reliable and more competent compared to new

members who create a project for the first time on the
platform.

5.2. Technological characteristics
5.2.1. Source code. The source code of an enterprise is
the result of programming activities and is also a central
component of a technology-based enterprise. The
source code of an enterprise also signals its
technological capabilities [5] - [7]. The success of the
campaign is more likely to occur in ventures where
source code is available [37]. Some authors believe that
the likelihood of an ICO's success is not affected by the
availability of a white paper, but is strongly and
positively affected by the presence of the source code of
the blockchain project [1]. On the other hand, a negative
aspect of publicly disclosing the source code, ICOs
allow other ventures to copy the technology and in this
way, they may lose their competitive advantage [53],
[65]
5.2.2.Token type. The big difference between ICOs
and other financing modalities is the possibility of
issuing tokens. ICO investors assign higher ratings to
utility tokens or security tokens [1], [7], [66]. Empirical
evidence reveals that the crypto market has been
dominated by utility tokens. Momtaz et.al. [10], states
that about 69% of all token sales can be classified in this
category and, in general, utility tokens reflect more than
90% of the total funds collected. On the other hand, less
than 5% is reflected by security tokens. However, Fisch
[7] finds no significant difference between the different
types of tokens and the amount raised in the campaign.
5.2.2.Token type. The big difference between ICOs
and other financing modalities is the possibility of
issuing tokens. ICO investors assign higher ratings to
utility tokens or security tokens [1], [7], [66]. Empirical
evidence reveals that the crypto market has been
dominated by utility tokens.
5.2.3.Ethereum platform. Ethereum was the first
platform to popularize and implement "smarts
contracts" and "dApps" (decentralized applications),
which allow the use of Ethereum's blockchain for
various applications. According to Fisch and Momtaz
[69], the Ethereum platform (ERC20) serves as the basis
for 88.1% of all ICOs studied. One of the advantages
pointed out by the literature regarding the use of the
Ethereum platform is the greater interoperability
between the parts of the transaction in the Ethereum
ecosystem. Thus, the offer of a token based on the
Ethereum platform may signal a greater technical
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capacity compared to the other platforms that issue
tokens [7], [28]

5.3. Governance and Legal Aspects
5.3.1. White paper. it is a document in which an
enterprise provides relevant information to the public
and is an important component of an ICO campaign [7],
[16], [52]. Authors believe that the dissemination of
white papers are indispensable for the success of the
campaign, together with a high quality source code, as
they increase the amount collected [7], [52].There is still
a great divergence of opinion on the ideal size of the
white paper. While some authors argue that ventures
that provide more information, and therefore white
papers, may be more attractive to potential investors
[70]. Amsden & Schweizer [37], measure the quality of
the white paper by the number of pages in it. However,
other authors claim that the length of the white paper
does not necessarily indicate quality [65], as some ICOs
tend not to systematically follow the information
disclosed in the white papers [67].
5.3.2. Social media. Investor comments on social media
play an information surveillance role, especially in an
unregulated market like ICOs. The importance of social
media can be attributed to the reduction of information
asymmetries associated with the market. Thus, ventures
disclose their information on a social media platform to
promote relationships between issuers and investors [6],
[65], [71], [72]. Due to the uninterrupted nature of token
offers, they depend largely on these social media as
channels of direct communication to their dispersed
investor base.
However, not all literature agrees with the importance
of social media and this issue is not yet a consensus.
Chen at.al. [6] highlight that the role of social media,
such as the types of platforms, the characteristics of
users and the communication channels should be further
investigated, both in the ICO issuance phase and also in
the value of post-ICO negotiations ( listing phase) [6].
5.3.3. VC support. Although ICOs are a type of
financing that is considered to be "democratic", due to
the opportunity of access to the general public for
investment in new ventures, conventional institutional
investors, such as VCs (venture capital), seem to be
investing more and more in tokens, especially in the
most expensive ICOs. sought by the market. Some
existing studies on ICOs model the choice of financing
modality between ICOs and venture capital [9], [76].
Chod at. al. [9], says that the ICO modality may be
preferable to venture capital financing, although it is

desirable to regulate the ICO market to reduce the
information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and
investors. Lukkarinen et. al. [47], find no evidence that
the investment criteria traditionally used by VC
investors would be relevant in predicting the success of
the crowdfunding campaign.
5.3.4. KYC. Many token offerings impose restrictions
on investors, such as whitelists or KYC (Know-YourCustomer) processes. These can reduce the number of
potential investors due to the additional cost and
increase the time it takes to raise funds from ICO and
can influence ICO's performance [77], [78]. On the
other hand, investor restrictions ensure that ventures
know who invests in their platform and can also help to
create long-term relationships between issuers and
investors [7].
5.3.5. Intermediate Evaluation (Rating). ICO rating
sites play an important role in this market. Broader
coverage of the campaign by these reviewers can then
lead to a more successful token sale. Thus, ICOs with
above-average ratings outperform token sales compared
to lower ratings [4], [52], and the likelihood of attracting
more VC funding [47], [69] increases. Higher rated
ICOs are more likely to obtain resources and tokens are
also more liquid and less likely to fail after the
completion of the ICO. In general, research points to the
importance of evaluating information intermediaries in
the functioning of the unregulated cryptography market
[53]

5.3.6. Tokens and property rights. Property rights in
ICOs are intrinsically related to the characteristics of
each type of token. In general, tokens rarely offer
property rights to investors, and in fact, most ventures
retain full ownership, regardless of the share of tokens
offered. Some ventures offer participation in the future
revenue of the venture, which allows an entrepreneur to
transfer part of the venture's risk to diversified investors,
but without diluting their control rights [7], [9].
However, ICOs, in general, tend to offer utility tokens
without explicit ownership rights or future cash flows.
These tokens do not offer ownership and control rights,
therefore, investor legal protection for this type of token
is currently almost nonexistent. [76], [79], [80].
Governance rights associated with tokens appear to have
an impact on the likelihood of success [16].
5.3.6.Patents. When launching an ICO to be able to
finance their ventures, entrepreneurs publicly disclose
their ideas and business strategies. Thus, they assume
the risk of misappropriation of this information by
competitors. Due to this public disclosure of the project,
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it is necessary to protect the company's intellectual
capital through patents or trademarks.
5.3.7.Financial systems developed. Huang, Meoli and
Vismara [87] analyze the geography of ICOs.
According to the authors, ICOs occur more frequently
in countries with developed financial systems, public
equity markets and advanced digital technologies.
5.3.8.Gender heterogeneity. Howell et. al. [33]
researched 387 ICOs about the main founder or CEO
and found that 97% are male. Ibba et.al [88] point out
that the number of men is about 5 times greater than the
number of women in ICO teams. There is no case of a
team composed only of women. The male
predominance has already been studied in corporate
finance in other types of financing [89] - [92]. There are
many gender-related differences in the behavior of
investors in companies seeking financing. In addition,
investors are more likely to invest in projects where the
proportion of male investors is higher. Cumming et al.
[92] point out that the ethical basis and risk aversion,
makes the gender diversity on the boards of directors
can act as a moderator for the frequency of fraud.
5.3.9.Family. In line with the empirical literature on the
subject, those with two members of the senior
management team with the same family name are
identified as family businesses [63], [93]. Astrachan et
al., [94] claim that 85% of all established enterprises
start with some level of family support. Parker [95]
reports that 31% of start-up funds come from friends and
family. Friends and family tend to contribute at the
beginning of the venture's financing cycle [96] and that
entrepreneurs give these members greater participation
in their business and treat all members equally,
regardless of their contribution [97].

due to the uncertainties of this barely legalized market,
as well as the different regulations between different
jurisdictions. In this way, the regulatory uncertainty that
permeates the ICOs market means that some enterprises
are unable to specify the law and jurisdiction applicable
to the business model [52], [65].
5.3.11.Restricted areas. Lists of restricted areas, which
specify where the venture cannot operate, are used to
ensure compliance with international sanctions and
avoid litigation in areas considered to be at high risk,
this reduces the uncertainty of the venture [37]. These
signal that the ICO management knows the regulations
of the potential country, reducing the risk of any legal
breach or investigation by the authorities of the
respective jurisdictions. However, research points out
that projects that restrict certain countries (mainly USA
and China) decrease the amount raised in the campaign
[11], [28]. As these are large investment markets, not
operating in these countries could reduce the likelihood
of success.

5.4. Financial details of the campaign
5.4.1.Disclosure of the application of future revenue.
Technology companies can demand big resource
commitments to conduct exploratory development
projects. However, the desired revenues and profits do
not usually happen in the short term. These emerging
markets are progressing in unpredictable ways. In this
way, information about the quality of technology
companies at an early stage should be disseminated to
facilitate investment appraisals [103].

5.3.9.Crowdfunding platforms. Huang, Meoli and
Vismara [87] claim that countries where there is a
greater availability of equity crowdfunding platforms
are also more likely to have ICOs. This issue is
explained due to the maturity of the use of technological
mechanisms to finance entrepreneurial projects already
well developed in these countries. They also point out
that ICOs are more likely to emerge in countries with
developed financial markets and where information and
communication technology is more advanced.

5.4.2.Bonus. Token offers that feature bonus structures
can encourage investors to increase investment volumes
or even to invest in advance and can also attract new
investors [1], [109]. Bonus structures reduce the
investment risk for investors and can increase the
success of the campaign [37]. However, another study
indicates that the use of bonuses in the campaign may
also signal that the project team is struggling to attract
interest from investors and may indicate the lack of
quality of the projects. In this regard, further study is
considered necessary. different bonus schemes to
understand their attractiveness to investors [1].

5.3.10.Jurisdiction. Adhami, Giudici, & Martinazzi [1]
found that the minority of enterprises discloses in the
White paper the regulatory specifications of the
jurisdiction where the ICOs will operate. Despite this,
there is still a lot of complexity in the regulatory context
that follows each ICO. This regulatory complexity is

5.4.3. Campaign time. During the launch phase of the
ICO, the project team announces the number of days
that the campaign will accept funding, so the campaign
time is set in advance. Many studies have already been
carried out in other types of crowdfunding, such as
crowdfunding, to understand the ideal duration of time
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for campaigns. Mollick [8] and Vismara [59] report that
campaigns with a longer duration are less likely to reach
their funding goals. This is because a longer campaign
can signal a lack of confidence in the project for
potential investors. Colombo, Franzoni, & RossiLamastra [110] claim that when the funding target is
reached in just one sixth of the duration it can indicate a
positive association with success.
5.4.4. Held tokens. Enterprises that retain a larger
fraction of tokens can signal commitment, in addition to
aligning the interests of owners and employees (who are
generally rewarded with tokens) and investors. The
evaluation of the financial details of an ICO, such as the
percentage of tokens held by issuers, is a very strong
sign of the entrepreneurs' commitment to the success of
the business. Thus, higher levels of business confidence
in enterprises are positively correlated with the
percentage of tokens that they retain [37].
5.4.5. Token provision. Token delivery is defined with
the number of tokens issued by an ICO during the
campaign. The ventures freely determine the number of
tokens that will be issued in the campaign. Companies
generally fix the maximum supply of tokens in the smart
contract [67]. Fisch (2019) finds a positive relationship
between the supply of tokens and the amount raised in
the campaign. Studies indicate that it is likely that the
greater the number of tokens, the greater the capacity to
attract new users and, therefore, the lesser the
uncertainty of the enterprise [7], [37]. However, these
studies are not yet conclusive.
5.4.6. Legal currency (Fiat). Projects that accept an
increase in legal tender, reduce the barriers for investors
to enter the new market. A Fiat currency is any legal
currency supported by the government. The acceptance
of the Fiat currency may presumably signal that the ICO
has ties to the traditional banking system, may signal
greater reliability of the venture and could potentially
increase the number of investors. [11], [37]. However,
the use of cryptocurrencies makes transactions more
quickly verifiable and involves lower costs than
payments using fiat money, which could discourage
investors and decrease the chances of a successful
venture [10]
5.4.7. Market sentiment. The ICO market is extremely
volatile and complex. [67], [72]. ICO teams and
investors need to be aware of the speed of change and
the technological risks of the market. Software startups
in general, and even more startups founded through an
ICO, operated under conditions of great uncertainty and
the capacity currencies listed during periods with

negative investor sentiment generate negative returns in
the short term.

6. Type-style and fonts
Wherever Times is specified, Times Roman or
Times New Roman may be used. If neither is available
on your word processor, please use the font closest in
appearance to Times. Avoid using bit-mapped fonts if
possible. True-Type 1 fonts are preferred.

6. Conclusions
The constant growth of publications and the
ongoing academic discussion highlight the growing
reputation, legitimacy and institutionalization of ICOs
as a new field of research in the field of corporate
finance. Thus, the aim of our study is to provide a clear
picture of current research on funding in this modality
and to critically evaluate the existing literature. To
navigate the complexity, we present and discuss our
results across the categories and perspectives identified.
The results of our systematic review and thematic
analysis of publications illustrate that ICO research can
be categorized into four different perspectives: human
and social capital, technological characteristics,
governance and legal aspects and financial details of the
campaign.
Consequently, our study provides an initial step
towards advancing research on ICOs, serving as a
scientific knowledge base to guide and encourage future
research efforts. As this type of crowdfunding where
tokens are issued gains increasing popularity as a viable
financing alternative, the analysis of the determinants
that predict post-campaign success may be a future
research proposal. Studies that evaluate the impact of
the covid-19 pandemic on this type of financing would
also be interesting. It is known that we still have many
challenges for this, due to the innovative character of
this modality. Issues related to the correlation between
the traditional market and ICOs. However, for the
success of this type of crowdfunding in the long term,
future studies need to examine which factors determine
post-campaign success and whether the signs associated
with campaign success are also predictors of the overall
success of the venture after a successful campaign.
successful.
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